Following the French success on 21st June, the 29th Division (under their new commander, Major-General De Lisle) submitted a plan for a limited objective attack along the Gully Ravine Spur. The attack would be reinforced by 29th Indian Brigade and the newly-arrived 156th Brigade of 52nd (Lowland) Division, and would be backed by the whole artillery of the MEF plus nine French 155mm howitzers. That this meant only 77 guns and howitzers shows how drastically short of artillery they were. (A force the size of the MEF should have fielded at least 208 pieces). The ammunition supply was also desperately short and only 12,000 rounds could be allocated to the attack, almost wholly on 29th Division's front, with very little for 156th Brigade. The corps commander, Hunter-Weston, tried for an increase in French artillery support to no avail.

By MEF standards 28th June saw an intense bombardment and 87th Brigade rushed the first two Turkish trench lines with relative ease (after one of their battalions had stormed the Boomerang Redoubt). 86th Brigade then pressed the attack on through two more trench lines and the Indian Brigade (with naval gunfire support) cleared the coastal trenches as far as Fusilier Bluff. After an advance of 1,000 yards, all reports state that were no Turks before the division and that a fresh formation attacking at this stage could have made very significant progress beyond Krithia and in behind Achi Baba.

However, a major tragedy overwhelmed 156th Brigade in their first battle as they bravely attacked with almost no artillery preparation. Their first rush carried them into the Turkish lines but subsequent efforts failed bloodily. Their brigade commander, Scott-Moncrieffe, was killed leading the reserve battalion forward.

Turkish counter-attacks regained part of the trenches on Gully Ravine Spur but their losses were very heavy. Over the next few days British losses rose to about 3,800 but the Turks admit to at least 14,000 casualties as their counter-attacks were shot down. The action was a tactical success that showed what might have been achieved with better artillery provision, and if fresh formations had been made available from London with more speed.