2/1st & 2/11th Battalions
Peter Stanley, Principal Historian, AWM
The Battle of Retimo
In May 1941 Australian and Greek troops, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ian Campbell, prepared to defend Retimo airstrip as part of the Allied defence of Crete.
Before the battle Campbell inspired his troops with Kipling's poem, 'If':
If you can meet with triumph and disaster
And treat the two imposters just the same
You'll be a man my son
There could be no more fitting description for the Battle of Retimo. The aggressive and ultimately successful defence of Retimo airstrip was a bitter-sweet victory for the Australian troops as Allied forces elsewhere in Crete succumbed to the German onslaught. The battle raged with varying intensity from 20 May to 30 May. In the first two days the vital ground overlooking the airstrip 'Hill A' was hotly contested.
Campbell's force was composed of two Australian battalions: the 2/1 Bn, and the 2/11 Bn (1250 men), and two Greek battalions, 4 Bn and 5Bn (2300 men). Captain Embrey describes the Greeks as 'conscripts of about three weeks training'. The Greek battalions were poorly trained and equipped with various rifles, little ammunition and some old machine guns. A separate Greek force of about 800 Cretan police were stationed near the town of Retimo. This force was well trained and equipped as infantry.
The 2/1 and 2/11 were reasonably well equipped with rifles, Brens, anti-tank rifles, sub-machine guns, 2 mortars (without base plates) and 2 carriers each. There was one battery 2/3 Field Regiment (about 90 men) with explosives and little other equipment. The Allied force also included two platoons, 2/1 Machine Gun Bn, fully equipped but without rifles for personal protection and with little ammunition; one section 2/8 Field Company, with no explosives and hardly any equipment, one company 2/7 Field Ambulance, a tank regiment detachment with two Matilda tanks, and signals detachments.
Although short of arms and ammunition, the Australians were battle-hardened soldiers who had fought in the Western Desert and also in Greece. The battalion had taken a leading part in the successful First Libyan campaign. Campbell's troops maintained their high morale in the face of the arduous withdrawal in Greece. Campbell reports in his memoir that 'morale was high and they were eager for a fight'.
In Campbell's opinion the 7th Flieger Division was the elite division of the German army, 'this was their only parachute division. Their morale was high, all their previous campaigns had been successful' (Norway & Belgium 1940; Corinth 1941). The German force at Retimo was composed of 2nd Parachute Rifle Regiment, less one battalion, under Col Alfred Sturm, along with a Machine Gun Company and a Heavy Weapons Detachment equipped with mortars, armour piercing machine guns, light howitzers, and anti-tank guns. In all, there were about 1600 well-equipped and highly trained troops. The Germans expected little opposition. Sturm's plan was simple, the 1st Battalion reinforced by a machine gun company, would come down east of the airstrip and capture it. The 3rd Battalion with artillery, would land between the Platanes River and Perivolia, and seize Retimo. Sturm with his HQ staff and a rifle company, would drop west of the airstrip and act as a reserve. These plans were discovered when Sturm was captured by the 2/11 Bn during the battle.
German accounts of the landing indicate that they intended to quickly capture the airstrip and move west the 4 miles to Retimo city, occupy it and then west by road to Suda Bay. But, as General Ringel's account testifies, 'the command's assumption that this small landing field would be held by only weak forces did not hold true'.
The Battlefield
The airstrip was 6.5 km east of Retimo, a town of about 10,000. It was a narrow strip 1280 metres long, suitable for fighters and light aircraft only. The airstrip ran parallel to the coastline, which ran east to west and straight for three miles. A narrow east west ridge overlooked the airstrip. The ridge was separated from the mountains to the south by a narrow valley wherein lay the villages of Pigi and Adhele. The landscape, with its high ridges overlooking the coastal plain and airstrip, favored the defenders. Gullys, or 'wadis', running down between the ridges provided shelter for Campbell's troops to move about.
Retimo, 1945. Taken from the site in May 1941 of headquarters 2/1st Battalion position on a spur of Hill D, overlooking the airstrip (AWM 131066)
The hills were terraced with vineyards. Olive groves gave particularly good cover against air observation. Above the coastal strip the ground was harsh and stony. Campbell writes 'It was Spring and the whole countryside was covered in wildflowers', the weather was uncomfortably hot.
At the eastern end of the airstrip was the vital position of Hill A, which jutted out from the main east west ridge and almost reached the sea. Because of its height and location, use of the airstrip was impossible without the capture of Hill A. To the east of Hill A was the village of Stavromenos, whose olive oil factory with its 50 foot chimney would become the Germans HQ during the battle. Hill D lay to the south of Hill A, rising between Wadi Bardia on the east, and Wadi Pigi on the west. Hill B lay to the west of Hill A; and Hill C further to the west overlooking and south of Perivolia. The battalion HQ was established in a depression behind the ridge of a spur south of the airstrip. Campbell had a practically uninterrupted view of Hill A, the airstrip and the coastal plain as far west as Retimo.
 Retimo 1945. View of airfield from the site of headquarters 2/1st battalion position on spur of Hill D (AWM131063)
Retimo, 1945. Looking towards the olive oil factory at Stavromenos from Hill A (AWM 131052)
A similar view taken on the Battlefield tour September 2002
The 2/1 Bn held the vineyard covered Hill A and the ridge to the south of the airstrip. To the left along this ridge Campbell placed the 4th Greek Bn. To the west again was the 2/11 Bn, commanded by Major Sandover, positioned along the east-west ridge until it dropped away to the road junction of Platanes (from Wadi Adhele to the western end of the ridge at Hill B). Initially the role of the 2/11 was to provide a reserve to the 2/1 fighting on Hill A. The 5th Greek Bn was in reserve in the valley to the south between Pigi and Adhele. The Cretan police were stationed close to Retimo.
Figure 1 Situation at Retimo, evening 20 May (Gavin Long)
Around the airstrip weapon pits were dug under the olive trees. This concealment tactic was very effective. Although the Germans flew reconnaissance planes every day from 3 May at about 10,000 feet, they had the impression that the airstrip was virtually undefended. Slit trenches were dug close to the back of terraces and sometimes tunnelling into them. The men lived in the trenches. The airstrip was enclosed by a barbed wire apron fence. Four field guns were dug in on the forward slopes of Hill A., two more were on the rear of Hill A. The remaining two guns were on Hill B. Campbell put the 2 Matilda tanks under large olive trees near the airstrip in Wadi Pigi.
AWM 131031 Retimo 1945. The road, airstrip and the site of former Australian positions, seen from the beach north of the airfield.
Figure 2. A Company Platoons, artillery and machine gun positions, Hill A, 20 May (The First at war)
The Battle for Hill A
Campbell writes that as May advanced, each day they heard the 'roar of aerial attacks in the Suda Bay area 25 miles to the west'. 'The morning of 20 May dawned bright and clear, the sun hoisted itself into a blue cloudless sky... a large force of German aircraft, each towing a glider, passed over us flying from east to west towards Suda Bay at about 3000ft'. The Australians were on high alert, waiting for an attack on their position. Campbell continues, 'this occurred at 1600, when ten aircraft bombed and straffed the airstrip and vicinity... because of the excellent concealment and cover, the German attack did negligible damage'.
Then transport planes were seen coming in from the sea 3 Km east of Hill A. The Australians opened fire and it was impossible to miss. Some of the 161 aircraft were immediately shot down in flames. Campbell writes, 'Parachute after parachute billowed open in the wake of the planes'. Many of the paratroops died still hanging or separating themselves from their harnesses. Pte Lofty McKie in his weapon pit on Hill A, gave this description: 'I turned the Bren on the men coming down, they landed all round our position right on top of us... I got many in the first wave – they were so close you couldn't miss'. One trooper remarked 'I'll never need to go duck shooting again'. Lew Lind, in the 2/3 Field Regiment, describes the paratroops, 'their knees were hunched up close to their chins and they were firing Tommy guns clamped between their knees'. Campbell says, 'Troops from both sides inextricably mingled in many places'. Lt Dieppe was in a very hot spot, he says 'I saw one of our 2/1 Machine Gun battalion machine guns being enveloped by a parachute. At the same time one parachutist landed almost on top of me, and immediately surrendered. He was shaking like a leaf... I saw a parachutist throwing a stick grenade while still in the air'.
The German force attacking Hill A was commanded by Major Kroh. Kroh, although mistakenly dropped 5 km to the east with his HQ and one corps of paratroops, was able to join the battle and coordinate the action. The extensive cover provided by vines and terraces gave the Germans the chance to regroup.
The artillery and machine-gunners on Hill A faced a relentless attack and suffered heavy casualties. Sgt Roffey, of D Company, says he thought they were in the middle of the jump zone. On the forward slope with two 75mm guns, they faced the first direct assault by the paratroops. Sgt Roffey saw Germans standing in the doorways of the planes, pushing out the dead to clear the exits before jumping. He describes an 'enormous din from the bombers and fighters strafing the area, the automatics of the paratroops in the air and on the land, from bursting grenades and small arms fire of the Australians'. Capt Killey saw the enemy crawling towards them from all directions, he shot three with his pistol at a distance of 3m or less. The Australians fought with whatever came to hand, including picks and shovels. Six of the Australian gunners died in the first few minutes.
Under heavy mortar fire, the Australian gunners were forced to pull back carrying their firing mechanisms with them. The Germans advanced to the gun positions and could be heard trying to get them to fire.
On the edge of the airstrip, on the left front of the 2/1 Bn, the Transport Section of HQ Coy put in a fierce bayonet charge against an enemy occupied wireless hut. The Germans broke up and ran. George Hooper witnessed this charge: 'this action, small though it may have been, was to my mind a most important one, highlighting as it did the tremendous morale of the battalion as a whole at the time... the transport section was a an excellent body of men but, as fighting troops go, could hardly be called the highest trained or most war like section of the unit'.
Campbell ordered the two Matilda tanks to move east across the airstrip and join the defence of Hill A. But these got stuck and their crews were captured. These tanks were captured by the enemy and then re-captured by the Australians over the next few days.
A Company, on the south eastern slopes of Hill A, became completely surrounded. Cpl Robinson describes the situation, 'in spite of the resistance from our area, after about one and a half hours, our section was being fired on from the rear [airstrip] side. I was hit in the head, the bullet entering my steel helmet ... I bled quite badly... the bullet lodged in the hat lining where I found it the next day... after dark we were fired at from all sides... I had lost touch with the sections on both sides of us... about 2100, grenades were being thrown and appeared to be coming from the dead ground of the terrace below'. Robinson's platoon retreated in the darkness under cover of the vines, and 'with more luck than I have ever had in my life' made it back to his HQ.
Behind the crest of Hill A, Gunner Snowy Wilson tells how his troop fared as the Germans began to approach within a metre or two of their position. As one paratrooper leapt forward to fire his machine gun into the gun pit, the Australians, having little else to defend themselves with, fired the 100mm gun at point blank range, the man vanished in a puff of smoke and flame.
By now the Germans had a footing on the ridge top and eastern slopes of Hill A. Across the neck of Hill A, Campbell's force held the lower western and southern slopes. Capt Embrey sums up the situation 'the enemy obtained no foothold on the aerodrome and by night he had been driven off... A Coy received heavy casualties but inflicted heavier... during the night 20/21 May, intense fighting continued'. At midnight, Lt Col Campbell received a reply from Force HQ to his request for reinforcements, the message was 'unable to send help – hold on – know you will – good luck'.
Campbell tells how only one Australian section held on the forward slopes of Hill A. Corporal Herbert Johnston commanded a section of about seven men that was completely surrounded. Campbell says that Johnston refused to give ground for a long and vital period of the battle and did a lot to hamper the Germans. Johnston was awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal; his citation reads in part, 'the action of Cpl Johnston was of the finest spirit of determination and courage which could be asked on any soldier'.
The Australians launched a fresh attack at dawn. Lt Dieppe describes how 'at 0525 sharp we moved out silently in one straight line, at walking pace, towards the enemy positions. After an advance of approximately 90 metres, the darkness was broken by heavy enemy machine gun fire... the enemy started using mortars'.
Pte Lofty McKie describes the confusion: 'Lt Whittle was to attack the spur from the south through the vineyard, while Capt Channell led a line of men up the western side. As I was snaking through the vineyard, I turned to see who was snaking along behind me. It was a Gerry! They must have been trying to reinforce along the same line we were attacking on. The German had a Tommy gun but he didn't seem able to pull the trigger. I was...'. Soon after McKie describes how he 'got a burst in the back from a machine gun'. He lay wounded for most of the morning suffering terribly from thirst, but was later rescued and survived. Capt Channell was awarded a Military Cross, the citation reads 'pressing forward in leading the attack Capt Channell was wounded but continued to lead his men against heavy opposing fire; finally destroying a German MG Post...'.
The Australians position was now very tenuous clinging to the south west slopes of Hill A. Campbell says he received a message: 'Position on Hill A very desperate'. Campbell headed for Hill A collecting his reserve D company under Capt Boyd Moriarty and his B Company under Capt Fred Embrey. On arrival at the western end of Hill A Campbell discovered that his A company commander Capt Douglas Channell, had been badly wounded in the dawn attack.
Fearing the Germans might move inland and attack his exposed right rear, Campbell moved his B Company under Capt Embrey south from Hill A up Wadi Baria, and posted them guarding the right rear on the ridge. Campbell then went back to his HQ, which had been forced by German mortar fire directed from Hill A to move back 200 yards.
Shortly after arriving back, Campbell's Adjutant Lt Ron Willmott came in with an 'amazing story' of changing fortunes. Campbell had earlier sent Willmott to move south west to see if the reserve Greek battalion was in position to guard Campbell's right rear. As Willmott moved down from the east west ridge they were on, he was captured by a German parachute force which had penetrated during the night around Campbell's 2/11 Bn, and captured their hospital at Adhele. The German force then moved west toward Wadi Pigi toward Campbell's administrative area, but the captors were themselves ambushed and captured, and Willmott regained his freedom.
Campbell rallied every available man and headed for Hill A. About this time, a German bomber dropped six bombs on the German frontline on the neck of Hill A, killing sixteen of their troops. Sgt Roffey was near the area and comments 'one or two [bombs] dropped on the particular gun we were interested in. In the ensuing confusion in went my platoon. What a sight presented to us. Three or four half Germans were making feebly the motions of begging cigarettes'.
Capt Moriarty, now in charge of the counter-attack, organised four groups into a vigorous and effective force that cleared successive German positions across the Hill and outflanked the Germans by moving down the gully. Campbell heard from Moriarty that his attack to clear Hill A had succeeded and the remaining Germans had withdrawn east along the coast to fortify an olive oil factory about a mile east of Hill A, near Stavromenos. Capt Embrey reported no sign of Germans on the right rear, and the Reserve Greek Bn was in position south of the Olive Oil factory as arranged, Campbell writes in his memoir that at this stage the 'the crisis on Hill A seemed to be over along with the immediate threat to the airstrip'.
 Figure 3. Moriarty's tactic to clear the enemy from Hill A (Gavin Long)
The retreating Germans had abandoned their ambulance station; the doctors staff and patients all were captured, 'but were at once treated as equal to our own wounded and ambulance staff'. They were taken to Campbell's ambulance station at Adhele (this station had itself been captured by the Germans on 21 May) and during the next nine days the medical staff from the opposing forces worked together. The Germans were well supplied with medical equipment and medicines, and the cooperative arrangement benefited the wounded from both sides.
By the end of day two, eighteen hours after the landing, the airstrip and the positions commanding it were secure. The Allied force's main task had been accomplished. But two strongly established groups of Germans remained. One group was in the east, in and around the olive oil factory at Stavromenos. The other group was in the western sector, where paratroops landed on the 2/11 Bn (on Campbell's left flank). Another strong force of 500 Germans moved west towards Retimo. This group was out of range of the very effective machine gun fire delivered by the 2/11 Bn. But they were stopped by the Greek Police Academy force who held them at Perivolia. Campbell says the police 'fought very well and suffered severe casualties'.
Perivolia
By nightfall on the 20 May, the 2/11 Bn had captured 84 prisoners and a 'mass of captured arms'. Greatly to the Australians advantage, Major Sandover could speak German. He found out from the prisoners that no more paratroops would be landed and translated a captured code of signals. The next day his men laid out on the ground the sign calling for more mortar bombs, and a German supply plane complied. In this way, numerous weapons and supplies were dropped by the Germans to the Australians during the battle.
On 22 May, Campbell ordered the 2/11 Bn to push west against the Germans fortified in Perivolia. He wanted to destroy this force and open land communications with Suda Bay. The next day, Capt Honner laid on the ground a signal calling for German aircraft to bomb Perivolia, and the aircraft obeyed. However, the Germans established a stronghold in Perivolia, in and around the Church of St. George overlooking the ground across which the Australians and Greeks were to launch their attack. On the 23 May, the Germans were driven from the church when the 2/11 shelled it with a captured anti-tank gun. But the German position was still strong in the village.
Campbell was again in possession of the two tanks. Men of his carrier platoon learned to drive and use the tanks. On 24 May a tank was sent to assist the 2/11 Battalion's dawn attack at Perivolia. But the tank got stuck in a creek. The attack was postponed. By the 27 May both tanks were back in action, and the 2/11 attack on Perivolia was re-launched. Once again, the tanks were both put out of action, this time by anti-tank shells. Another attack was launched at night on 28 May from the high ground to the south east with two companies. This failed to overpower the Germans and Campbell decided to abandon further offensive action at Perivolia.
Stavromenos
Meanwhile, the 2/1 Bn advanced east against the Germans at the olive oil factory at Stavromenos. The brick factory was solidly constructed and Campbell's few artillery shells were not heavy enough to demolish it. Whenever the Australian gunners in their exposed position on top of Hill A opened fire on the factory, the German mortars opened fire with 'deadly accuracy'.
Retimo 1945. View of Hill A from near the olive oil factory at Stavromenos (AWM 131027)
On the morning of 22 May, Moriarty was killed by a German sniper. Campbell ordered a combined attack on the factory on the morning of 22 May with A Company (led by Capt Dick Mann) assaulting from a narrow valley to the south and a Greek force attacking around a spur just east of the factory. The Greek force failed to attack on time and Capt Mann was seriously wounded. Campbell withdrew the remnant of Mann's force after dark.
On the 25 May the German commander withdrew from the factory, leaving about forty Germans guarding the tank crew prisoners still in the factory. These surrendered on 26 May when Campbell attacked the factory with B Company commanded by Capt Embrey, and supported by the heavy tank. The capture of the factory ended any immediate threat to Campbell's eastern flank. Embrey says 'the capture of Stavromenos practically ended offensive action by us, as the CO refused to be drawn away from his object – to deny the use of the aerodrome from the enemy'.
Campbell writes 'I was totally unaware of the progress of the fighting on the rest of the island'. There was no land line or other secret means of communicating with HQ at Suda Bay or the force at Heraklion – 'we had one good wireless set with operators which could speak to Creforce, but no code or cypher'. The Germans were also unable to keep contact outside of the sector. They had lost their signals section during the initial landings and the surviving paratroops had no radios. The fate of 2nd Parachute Rifle Regiment was not known to German HQ in Athens.
On the night of the final attack on Perivolia (27/28 May), some rations were delivered by a small naval lighter from Suda Bay, but there was no message from HQ. Campbell learnt later that there had been a message prepared but it failed to get to the ship before it departed. He comments that if he had received this vital message, which said for him to 'commence withdrawal night 28/29 May to and embarkation at Plakias Bay [Sfakia] on the south coast', many of the able bodied men of his command would have escaped.
Surrender
On the morning of 30 May German reinforcements came from the east and overran Campbell's force. As Germans streamed into Retimo and along the road to the airstrip, defeat seemed inconceivable after the victories of the previous days. 'Oh Jesus', said Lew Lind, 'I don't bloody well believe it'. Capt Embrey says that Campbell 'instructed the QM and myself to accompany him with a white flag as further fighting was useless'.
At the time of capitulation, about 500 German prisoners were held by the Australians, but were then liberated. The Australians had lost about 120 killed; but the Germans had lost at least 550 killed. Martin Pöppell, a German paratrooper writes, 'All day we were kept busy with the task of burying our dead... planeloads had landed in the middle of enemy positions. Our comrades lay there still, their parachutes behind them, mown down in the order they had jumped'. Although about half of the surviving members of the 2/11 Battalion attempted escape, only a small number of Australians, 13 officers and 30 other ranks, eventually got back to North Africa.
The battle had also taken its toll on the local civilians. Capt Embrey comments 'the enemy bombed Retimo heavily... at all times during daylight there appeared to be about 6 [bombers] overhead – this applies to every day from 20 May to our capture. At times there were as many as 30 bombers'. Lew Lind describes the scene at Retimo, 'Even in the town there was no respite for there, sad faced Greeks were searching the fire blackened ruins for loved ones... Along the footpaths the bodies of women and children lay in neat rows'.
 Brigadier I R Campbell 1945. (AWM120557)
 This paper is based on Campbell's memoir, held by the Australian War Memorial. Other first hand accounts include from the battalion history The First at war and reports by Captain Fred Embrey. Campbell was eighty two years old when he wrote his memoir. He relates in the closing pages that he visited Crete in 1975 for the official unveiling of a war memorial paid for and built by the citizens of Rethymon. He comments, 'this is the only memorial to fallen Australian servicemen which has ever been erected by foreigners in their land'. Campbell described the memorial as 'an impressive one... located between Hill A and the spot where the olive oil factory used to stand'.
Campbell's memoirs are a fitting tribute to the Australians who met with 'triumph and disaster' at Retimo.
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